Journal of International Economics Research

♦ ISSN: 3070-5665 Vol: 05, No. 01, 2027 ♦ PP. 01–07

♦ Article DOI: https://doi.org/10.54216/JIER.050101



FULL LENGTH ARTICLE

Trade Barriers Within a Customs Union: Export Vulnerability and Market Adjustment in Armenia

Diana Galoyan[1,*]

[1] Doctor of Sciences, Professor, Russian-Armenian University, Yerevan, Republic of Armenia

Email: dianagaloyan@gmail.com

Received: May 04, 2026 Revised: June 28, 2026 Accepted: August 30, 2026 ⋆ Corresponding author

ABSTRACT

This paper examines Armenia's reliance on the EAEU market and the impact of Russia's 2026 trade restrictions on Armenian export patterns. It covers the full range of Armenian merchandise exports from 2015 to 2025 and looks at a number of specific developments in agricultural trade in 2026. The analysis is based on a range of statistical and comparative techniques to assess the geographical structure of exports, levels of market concentration and shifts in the pattern of destinations. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is used as a measure of the level of concentration of exports within the EAEU. The results show that Russia continues to be Armenia's dominant trading partner in the EAEU, taking up around 92% of Armenia's total exports to EAEU countries in 2025. The degree of dependence is particularly pronounced in the case of vegetables, fish and fruit with Russian market shares of 98%, 97% and 93% respectively. The trade restrictions introduced in 2026 were accompanied by a fall in agricultural exports and a change in the geographical pattern of those exports. Some exporters have shifted their products to Georgia, Uzbekistan and other countries. The data available do not allow us to determine whether these other markets have made up for the loss of exports to Russia. The findings confirm that export concentration remains a significant source of vulnerability for Armenian producers and that a greater degree of market diversification would be beneficial to the stability of Armenian foreign trade.

Keywords: Eurasian Economic Union ▪ Armenia ▪ Russia ▪ Customs union ▪ Trade restrictions ▪ Non-tariff barriers ▪ Export concentration ▪ Export vulnerability ▪ Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ▪ Export diversification ▪ Market adjustment

1. INTRODUCTION

Armenia became a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2015. As Russia has long been an important destination for Armenian products, one of the expected impacts of this membership for Armenia was better access to the markets of this country, as well as to other member states. For an economy with a relatively small domestic market and limited transport connections, the possibility of selling goods abroad under common trade rules has considerable economic importance. Nevertheless, access to a market depends on more than the removal of customs duties. Goods must also satisfy regulatory requirements and pass the necessary inspections, while transportation and administrative procedures may still create difficulties for exporters.

Armenia's experience shows that these difficulties have not disappeared with EAEU membership. Some research has already identified positive effects of Armenia's membership on the country's exports, including agricultural and food products [1]. At the same time, we should understand that the benefits of integration vary across member states and economic sectors. Studies of EAEU non-tariff barriers [2] and integration effects [3] indicate that the existence of a common customs territory does not always mean that producers

© 2027 The Author(s). Published by ASPG. This article is licensed under CC BY 4.0.

operate under the same favorable market conditions. In August 2025, Armenia's Food Safety Inspectorate announced enhanced controls over quarantine phytosanitary goods, including fresh fruit, vegetables, and flowers shipped to Russia [4]. The situation became more complicated in 2026. In May, Russia restricted imports of several categories of Arme-nian agricultural products, including flowers, vegetables, and fruits. Russian authorities said this was because of phytosan-itary and other regulatory concerns. Certain measures also affected the transportation of Armenian goods through Russia to other EAEU countries. Armenia raised this question with the Eurasian Economic Commission to better understand how these measures align with the arrangements governing trade between member states.

The possible economic consequences deserve particular attention. Many Armenian agricultural exporters depend on established Russian buyers, while their products are seasonal and cannot be stored for long periods. Finding a new destination takes time and involves additional costs. Exporters may need different certificates, new distributors, and transport arrangements. Some products can be redirected more easily than others. Therefore, the share of exports going to Russia is an important indicator of dependence, but it cannot fully explain the losses or adjustment opportunities arising from trade restrictions.

Armenia's post-2021 trade statistics also require caution. Research on sanction-related trade documents increased intermediary trade and re-exports through third countries [5]. The World Bank's January 2025 update likewise reports that re-exports of precious stones and transport equipment strongly affected Armenia's 2024 trade figures; excluding those cat-egories, exports grew by 32% through November 2024 [6]. Such flows must be distinguished from exports of Armenian-produced goods; otherwise, changes in aggregate exports may be misleading.

In this paper, we examine Armenia's trade with EAEU coun-tries over 2015–2026, paying particular attention to export concentration, the restrictions introduced in 2026, and the possibilities of redirecting exports to other markets. The main argument is that the effectiveness of regional integration should be considered not only in terms of increasing trade volumes but also in relation to the conditions under which producers can retain access to their principal export markets.

1.1 Research Gap

Studies of Armenia's EAEU membership have mainly ad-dressed trade expansion, tariff adjustments, and dependence on the Russian market. Non-tariff barriers have also received considerable attention. However, there is limited product-level evidence on how Armenian exporters respond when restrictions are introduced by their principal trading partner within the same economic union. It remains unclear whether products with greater dependence on Russia experience larger trade losses and whether alternative destinations can absorb part of the affected exports. The relationship between export concentration, regulatory restrictions and subsequent market adjustment therefore requires further empirical investigation.

1.2 Research Objective

This research seeks to provide a clearer picture of Armenia's export vulnerability within the EAEU and explore how trade may change in response to Russia's import restrictions in 2026. The study takes a closer look at the geographical and commodity structure of exports from 2015 to 2026, highlights the products affected by restrictions, and compares how their trade performance differs from that of less affected goods. It also takes a closer look at how Armenia's reliance on the Russian market relates to the practical workings of EAEU trade arrangements.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Regional integration is expected to boost trade between the member countries through the removal of tariffs and other trade costs. It may also have an effect on the spatial pattern of trade as the benefits to the various members may well alter their trade with third countries. The outcome will of course be very much dependent on the characteristics of the individual countries in question. Countries with different production structures, different market sizes and different transport opportunities are not going to gain the same from integration. That point has been made in a number of studies on the development of the EAEU.

Tarr [7] examined the economic underpinnings of the EAEU and found a number of structural and institutional impediments that could, in fact, work to the detriment of the integration process. Vinokurov [8], in his evaluation of the early results of the Union, also stressed the importance of eliminating internal trade barriers and improving co-ordination between the member states. Both of these studies point to the fact that common trade rules in themselves are not enough to solve the problems that businesses face. In reality, the conditions of trade are also determined by the way in which the rules are implemented, administered and regulated.

The empirical literature on the trade effects of EAEU membership is mixed. Cieślik and Gurshev [9], using bilateral trade data and gravity models, found the results were very country- and product-group specific. Cerqua et al. [3], using a non-parametric counterfactual approach, found more positive trade effects in the later stages of the Eurasian integration process. The findings point to a time-dependent outcome. The distribution of the benefits is also not equal in any case; an increase in total trade within the union does not mean that all the member countries and all the sectors within them are going to benefit.

Bekbolotova et al. [1] examined the effect of EAEU accession on Armenia and Kyrgyzstan using a dynamic multilevel latent factor model and found that total and agri-food exports from both countries increased as a result of accession. The size of the effect was however quite different between the two countries, which the authors attribute to differences in trade structure and the degree of persistence of internal barriers. Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan and Hugot [10] used structural gravity methods to assess the impact of tariff changes on Armenia's trade and welfare and their findings are quite informative. Tariff changes and regulatory restrictions can of course have an impact on trade through a number of channels.

Non-tariff barriers are a major issue in the EAEU. Vakulchuk

and Knobel [2] examined the effect of these barriers using the disaggregated trade data for the period 2010–2015 and found that there is a huge amount of potential for trade growth through the elimination of these barriers, especially in the agriculture and food processing sectors. Their model suggests that a 50% reduction in non-tariff barriers would lead to a 40% increase in trade in those sectors. Again, these figures are not directly transferable to the Armenian barriers of 2026, but the study does show that non-tariff barriers can have a very significant impact on trade within a customs union.

This is particularly pertinent for economies which are trade dependent. Mardanyan and Khachatryan [11] examine Armenia's degree of dependence on its foreign partners (particularly Russia) in agriculture, energy, finance and infrastructure. They found that the degree of dependence goes well beyond simply the volume of trade. With regard to exports, the degree of concentration has both benefits and drawbacks. On the one hand, established commercial relationships can lead to lower transaction costs and a more reliable flow of supply, and on the other hand, they can also lead to greater vulnerability if the primary market you are exporting to introduces new demands or restrictions.

Trade performance after 2021 is difficult to interpret. Khmeleva et al. [12] examined changes in intra-EAEU trade under sanctions, while Chupilkin et al. [5] analyzed intermediated trade linked to sanctions. These studies show why recorded export increases should not automatically be read as growth in domestic production without examining the origin and nature of goods.

Research done outside the EAEU is of considerable value in terms of understanding how exporters react to import restrictions. Ferguson et al. [13] examined the response of Chinese exporters to restrictions on Australian goods and found that the loss of one market doesn't necessarily lead to a corresponding fall in total exports. The outcome will be product-specific and will depend on the availability of alternative markets. Agricultural exporters are in a particularly difficult position due to the constraints of seasonality, storage and transport. Ahn and Steinbach [14] examined the impact of temporary trade measures on agricultural and food trade and Larch et al. [15] examined the differential impact of trade sanctions on various agricultural products and trade relationships.

The existing literature provides a good foundation for looking at Armenia's trade with the EAEU. It sets out the anticipated benefits of integration, highlights the continuing existence of internal trade barriers and shows how exporters might react to a range of different restrictions. The interaction of these factors in the Armenian case however has not been adequately examined. The restrictions due to come into force in 2026 provide an opportunity to look at whether greater export concentration increases vulnerability and to what extent existing trade relationships can be substituted by access to alternative markets.

3. METHODOLOGY

This paper looks at the extent to which Armenian exports are dependent on the EAEU and the potential impact of the trade restrictions that Russia imposed in 2026. The central hypothesis is that the greater the concentration of Armenian exports in the Russian market, the more vulnerable Armenian exporters will be to such restrictions. Conversely, access to alternative markets may mitigate the adverse effects of these restrictions. The purpose of testing this hypothesis is to assess the degree to which the level of export concentration, the imposition of trade restrictions and the ability of exporters to adjust to such changes are linked.

The methodological framework of this research includes the following stages:

1. **Analysis of Armenia's trade with the EAEU countries for the period 2015–2025.** In this phase a statistical and comparative analysis is undertaken to look at the evolution of Armenia's exports, their geographical composition and the role of Russia in its foreign trade. Particular focus is placed on the share of the EAEU countries in total exports and the changes that have occurred post 2021. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is calculated for the period 2021–2025 to assess the concentration of Armenian exports among the EAEU countries. The impact of re-export activity on the overall volume of Armenian exports is also considered. The annual export series is summarized in Table 1.
2. **Identification and classification of the trade restrictions introduced in 2026.** This involves the review of the published regulatory information and official statements relating to restrictions on Armenian products. The products are classified in accordance with the Harmonized System (HS). The analysis identifies the principal product categories, the dates on which the restrictions were introduced and their regulatory characteristics. Particular emphasis is placed on agricultural products.
3. **Assessment of the impact of the restrictions on exports.** A comparative analysis of the available statistical data on Armenian exports in 2026 is undertaken. The export figures for July 2026 are compared with those for the same period in 2025. A comparison is also made of the changes in physical volumes of export of certain agricultural products (apricots and cherries in particular). This enables us to assess the impact of the restrictions on the export of goods during the period in which they were in force. The data available however are not sufficient to separate out the impact of the restrictions from the impact of other factors.
4. **Analysis of export concentration and shifts in export destinations.** At this stage we assess the degree of dependence of the selected Armenian products on the Russian market via their export shares and values in 2025. Particular focus is on fruits, vegetables, fish products and alcoholic beverages. We also look at the reported shifts in the geographical distribution of agricultural exports in 2026 (to Georgia, Uzbekistan and others). A comparative analysis is undertaken to identify the initial shifts in destinations and the potential for reducing dependence on the Russian market.

The research is based on statistical data from the Statistical Committee of the Republic of Armenia, published trade statistics, World Bank data and information from various Armenian government agencies. Trade restrictions data is drawn

Table 1. Armenia's merchandise exports and EAEU concentration, 2015–2025

Year	Total exports	Exports to Russia	Russia export share	Exports to EAEU	EAEU export share
2015	1,482.7	225.9	15.2%	236.67	16%
2016	1,807.8	373.0	20.6%	392.44	21.7%
2017	2,145.0	540.5	25.2%	554.06	25.8%
2018	2,383.4	641.9	26.9%	664.37	27.9%
2019	2,618.6	718.5	27.4%	744.75	28.4%
2020	2,512.5	659.1	26.2%	688.52	27.4%
2021	2,964.8	793.9	26.8%	835.7	28.2%
2022	5,307.0	2,365.2	44.6%	2,463.9	46.4%
2023	8,371.2	3,383.9	40.4%	3,575.6	42.7%
2024	13,028.1	3,116.0	23.9%	3,299.1	25.3%
2025	8,340.0	2,920.0	35.0%	3,174.2	38.1%

Source: EDRC trade statistics. Monetary values are in USD million.

from regulatory announcements and published reports. The study employs statistical, comparative and concentration analysis and the findings enable us to assess Armenia's degree of dependence on the Russian market as well as the principal shifts in the pattern of agricultural exports in 2026.

4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Analysis of Armenia's foreign trade from 2015 to 2026 enables us to assess the evolution of the geographical structure of exports and Armenia's dependence on the EAEU market. Special attention is given to trade with Russia, which continues to be the primary destination for a number of Armenian product categories. The analysis also looks at the restrictions introduced in 2026 and the potential for export of the relevant products to other markets.

Armenia's total exports rose from $1.48bn in 2015 to $13.03bn in 2024. Exports to Russia increased from $225.9m to $3.12bn over the same period. The biggest growth was seen after 2021, when the trade flows changed significantly as a result of the international sanctions on Russia. Exports to Russia in 2022 were $2.37bn (up from $793.9m in 2021). Figure 1 shows the change in Russia's share of total Armenian exports.




Figure 1. Russia's share of Armenian exports, 2015–2025

Source: EDRC trade statistics.

Russia's share rose from 15.2% in 2015 to 26.8% in 2021 and hit 44.6% in 2022. It fell to 23.9% in 2024, and the preliminary 2025 figure is around 35%. This does not necessarily reflect any actual change in the volume of Armenian goods being exported. A large portion of the increase in 2022–2024 was due to intermediary trade and re-exports (particularly of precious metals and other products). Official statistics for January–June 2025 also named Russia, the United Arab Emirates and China as Armenia's top export destinations, while exports to several smaller markets increased [16].

The comparison of Armenian exports with exports to Russia shows that changes in total exports and changes in exports to Russia didn't track one another (Figure 2). So an assessment of Armenia's dependence on the Russian market based solely on total export volumes would be misleading.




Figure 2. Total exports versus exports to Russia, 2015–2025

Source: EDRC trade statistics.

The next phase is to measure the concentration of exports within the EAEU. The HHI was calculated using the shares of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan in Armenia's total exports to the EAEU.

Table 2. Geographical concentration of Armenian exports within the EAEU, 2021–2025

Year	Russia's share of EAEU exports	EAEU HHI
2021	95.00%	0.904
2022	95.99%	0.923
2023	94.64%	0.897
2024	94.45%	0.894
2025	91.99%	0.850

Source: Author's calculations from the annual trade dataset.

The HHI was 0.904 in 2021 and rose to 0.923 in 2022 before falling to 0.894 in 2024 and around 0.850 in 2025. That's

a clear indication of a degree of concentration, albeit a reduction in that concentration. The degree of dependence on Russia remains very high, with Russia accounting for 95% of Armenian exports to the EAEU in 2021 and 92% in 2025. The presence of several EAEU partners has not in any way diminished the degree of concentration on the Russian market. The HHI calculated is the HHI of Armenia's exports to the EAEU countries and not the geographical concentration of Armenia's exports across the world.

A more serious dependence is evident in individual product groups. Table 3 contains the estimates of exports of selected Armenian-origin products to Russia in 2025.

Table 3. Dependence of selected Armenian products on Russia, 2025

Product group	Exports to Russia, USD mln	Russia share in exports
Brandy and other strong spirits	285.0	84%
Fruits	104.0	93%
Vegetables	86.0	98%
Fish and seafood	81.0	97%

Source: EDRC trade statistics.

The author-calculated estimates show that Russia took 98% of Armenian vegetable exports, 97% of fish and seafood exports, and 93% of fruit exports. The corresponding values were \$86m, \$81m and \$104m. Russia's share in the exports of brandy and other strong spirits was 84% (Figure 3). These results are consistent with broader 2025 research identifying economic and food-sector dependence on Russia as a source of vulnerability [17].




Figure 3. Russia's share of selected Armenian domestic-origin exports, 2025

Source: Author's visualization based on EDRC trade statistics.

The results show that agricultural products are particularly vulnerable to changes in Russian import requirements. Unlike most industrial products, fresh fruit and vegetable products have a very limited shelf life. The extent to which their exports can be diverted will be determined by transport logistics, certification requirements and the availability of buyers.

The 2026 restrictions impacted a number of the product groups. Their classification according to the date and type of restriction is given in Table 4.

Table 4. Main restrictions introduced by Russia in 2026

Product category	HS code	Starting date
Cut flowers	0603	May 22
Tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers, strawberries	0702, 0707, 0709, 0810	May 30
Stone fruits and fresh grapes	0809, 080610	June 2
Pome fruits, eggplants, potatoes, dried fruits	Various	June 3
Quarantine-regulated products	Various	June 12
Fish products	Chapter 03	June (certification restrictions)

Source: Authors' compilation from regulatory announcements and published reports.

The first trade data available in this study indicate a decline in the performance of the affected sectors in July 2026, alongside substantial changes in other export categories, including precious and semi-precious stones. These concurrent movements mean that changes in aggregate exports cannot be attributed solely to Russia's restrictions.

Further detail on individual products shows a very significant shift in destination. The FSI data for July 2026 shows Armenian apricot exports to Russia were well over 20,600 tonnes in June 2025, but there were no exports to Russia at all in June 2026. The same data shows exports of cherries to Russia have dropped from around 1,800 tonnes to just 360kg. At the same time, new export markets were becoming increasingly important. In June 2026 some 1,600 tonnes of apricots were exported to Uzbekistan and 789 tonnes to Georgia. Cherries were at 720 tonnes to Georgia and 616 tonnes to Uzbekistan. The same pattern was seen with the peppers and tomatoes.

Table 5. Selected changes in agricultural export destinations, June 2025–2026

Product	Russia, June 2025	Russia, June 2026	Selected other destinations, June 2026
Apricots	Over 20,600 t	0 t reported	Uzbekistan 1,600 t; Georgia 789 t
Cherries	Approx. 1,800 t	0.36 t	Georgia 720 t; Uzbekistan 616 t
Peppers	Over 2,000 t	Not reported	Ukraine 669 t; Uzbekistan 367 t
Tomatoes	Approx. 1,500 t	Not reported	Uzbekistan 317 t; Ukraine 115 t

Source: Food Safety Inspection Body figures reported by Aurora News, July 7, 2026.

These figures do suggest that some of Armenia's agricultural exports have been diverted to other markets. The statistics don't tell us what proportion of the lost Russian sales has been fully made up, though. We also have to take into account the changes in agricultural production. The Ministry of Economy has stated that Armenia's apricot harvest in 2026 was substantially smaller than it was in 2025 and this also impacted the level of exports.

Government data for June to August 2026 shows that Armenia exported 4,506 tonnes of peppers, 4,041 tonnes of tomatoes and 408.6 tonnes of strawberries. The geographical spread of exports was up to 28 countries for flowers, 24 for fruit and 16 for vegetables. This clearly indicates that alternative markets were being utilized. The data does not, however, establish whether those new market relationships will be

able to provide the same volume and level of demand as the Russian market.

The analysis indicates that Armenia's export vulnerability is associated with the high concentration of certain product groups in Russia. The restrictions introduced in 2026 were followed by changes in agricultural exports and a wider geographical distribution of shipments. Nevertheless, their precise contribution to export losses requires comparable monthly product-level statistics, including values, quantities and unrestricted control products. The available evidence supports the assessment of trade concentration and initial market adjustment, but is not sufficient for estimating a separate causal effect through panel regression.

5. DISCUSSION

The study findings show that Armenia's participation in the EAEU has been associated with a significant increase in exports, though the geographical concentration of trade remains a major issue. Russia has remained by far the main destination for Armenian exports within the union. The HHI has declined from 0.904 in 2021 to around 0.850 in 2025, which is not really an indication of any diversification. Russia still accounted for around 92% of Armenia's exports to EAEU countries in 2025.

These findings are in line with the conclusions of Mardanyan and Khachatryan [11], who found a considerable degree of dependence on Russia in various sectors of the Armenian economy. The issue is most apparent in the case of agricultural exports. The study's calculations from EDRC trade statistics show that in 2025 Russia accounted for 98% of Armenian vegetable exports, 97% of fish exports and 93% of fruit exports (Table 3). This degree of concentration in one market renders producers vulnerable to changes in market access.

The 2026 restrictions clearly show the impact of this dependence. The drop in agricultural exports in July and the shift in destination countries all point to Armenian producers having real difficulties in sustaining their traditional trade relationships. This is in line with findings by Vakulchuk and Knobel [2], who found that non-tariff barriers can have a very significant effect on EAEU trade.

Another issue is the effectiveness of regional integration. The whole point of being in a customs union is to facilitate trade between the member countries. The experience of 2026 shows that regulatory barriers can still disrupt established supplies. Phytosanitary requirements are of course legitimate in the first instance and so their application and proportionality should be judged on their own merits rather than in terms of their economic impact.

The shift in agricultural export destinations does point to some scope for diversification. Exports to Georgia, Uzbekistan and the other countries in that region have gone up and the number of destinations for a number of products has also increased. Ferguson et al. [13] examined similar adjustment mechanisms. The existence of new markets doesn't necessarily mean that exporters can make up for the sales they've previously had to Russia.

The evidence would appear to suggest that Armenia's trade policy should be looking at reducing the concentration of its exports. Diversifying the range of trading partners may lead to a more stable level of exports, though this would clearly require better transport links, greater compliance with the requirements of foreign markets and more robust support for domestic producers.

6. CONCLUSION

The assessment of Armenia's trade with the EAEU over 2015–2026, with a specific focus on export concentration and the constraints imposed by Russia in 2026, revealed a very significant increase in trade post-accession, especially after 2021. Russia remains by far the largest exporter from Armenia to the EAEU.

The results also show a high degree of dependence on the Russian market in a number of agricultural product groups. The 2026 restrictions were accompanied by a significant fall in agricultural exports and a shift in the mix of destinations. There is some scope for market repositioning as exports have expanded to other destinations, though the data available don't indicate whether these other markets have made up the shortfall in sales to Russia.

The research shows that regional integration by itself does not get rid of the risks of export concentration. Armenia's export stability is not just a function of access to the EAEU market. It's also a function of the extent to which alternative trading relationships can be developed and the competitiveness of domestic production.

6.1 Policy Recommendations

Based on the findings the following measures are recommended to improve the stability of Armenian exports.

First, export diversification should be a priority in Armenia's foreign trade policy. Special attention should be paid to agricultural products, which are heavily dependent on Russia. Government support should be aimed at enabling producers to get into new markets rather than just making up for the temporary loss of exports.

Secondly, the development of transport and logistics infrastructure should be encouraged. Cold storage, refrigerated transport and modern distribution centers could all go a long way to reducing losses and improving access to more remote markets.

Thirdly, much greater attention should be paid to compliance with international sanitary, phytosanitary and quality requirements. That would assist Armenian producers in meeting the requirements of the importing countries and thus alleviate the problems associated with certification.

The EU–Armenia Strategic Agenda adopted on 2 December 2025 identifies trade diversification and connectivity as priorities for cooperation. It provides a policy framework for expanding market opportunities, although exporters must still meet rules of origin, product standards and other import requirements [18].

Finally, Armenia should continue its co-operation with EAEU institutions with the aim of improving the transparency and predictability of the regulatory procedures. A more diversified export structure in conjunction with the stability of trade relations within the EAEU would in turn reduce the exposure of Armenian producers to any future disruption.

6.3 Limitations of the Study

The study has a number of limitations. The analysis is largely based on published trade statistics and on preliminary information relating to the restrictions introduced in 2026. Detailed monthly export data by product and destination was not available for all the requisite periods and so it was not possible to precisely quantify the economic impact of any individual restriction.

Secondly, changes in agricultural exports could also be due to changes in the volume of production, harvest conditions, prices and foreign demand. All of those factors could not be disentangled from the impact of the trade restrictions.

Thirdly, the information currently available on exports to alternative markets doesn't allow us to work out what proportion of the Russian sales that were lost was made up through diversification of trade. That would be something that could be addressed with further research using more detailed customs and firm-level data.

REFERENCES

[1] S. Bekbolotova, N. Djanibekov, and T. Herzfeld, "How does regional economic integration impact trade in small economies? evidence from Armenia and Kyr-gyzstan's EAEU accession," *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, vol. 67, no. 7, pp. 829–857, 2025.

[2] R. Vakulchuk and A. Knobel, "Impact of non-tariff barriers on trade within the eurasian economic union," *Post-Communist Economies*, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 459–481, 2018.

[3] A. Cerqua, P. Montalbano, and Z. Temerbulatova, "A decade of eurasian integration: An ex-post non-parametric assessment of the eurasian economic union," *International Economics*, vol. 178, 2024.

[4] ARKA News Agency, "Control over quarantine phy-tosanitary goods in armenia and russia to be enhanced," August 27 2025.

[5] M. Chupilkin, B. Javorcik, A. Peeva, and A. Plekhanov, "Economic sanctions and intermediated trade," *AEA Pa-pers and Proceedings*, vol. 115, pp. 568–572, 2025.

[6] World Bank Group, "Armenia monthly economic up-date – january 2025," Macroeconomics, Trade and In-vestment, Tech. Rep., Jan. 2025.

[7] D. G. Tarr, "The eurasian economic union of russia, belarus, kazakhstan, armenia, and the kyrgyz republic: Can it succeed where its predecessor failed?" *Eastern European Economics*, vol. 54, no. 1, pp. 1–22, 2016.

[8] E. Vinokurov, "Eurasian economic union: Current state and preliminary results," *Russian Journal of Economics*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 54–70, 2017.

[9] A. Cieślik and O. Gurshev, "Friends with or without benefits? an empirical evaluation of bilateral trade and economic integration between some of the post-soviet economies," *Eurasian Economic Review*, vol. 12, pp. 769–795, 2022.

[10] A. Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan and J. Hugot, "Gravity-based tools to assess the impact of tariff changes: An application to armenia," *Asian Development Review*, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 219–256, 2024.

[11] H. Mardanyan and K. Khachatryan, "Armenia's dependence on foreign countries and sources in key economic and financial sectors," *Bulletin of Yerevan University G: Economics*, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 5–18, 2025.

[12] G. Khmeleva, M. Kurnikova, and E. Chirkunova, "The reconfiguration of intra-regional trade in the EAEU under sanctions against russia," *Bulletin of Yerevan University G: Economics*, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 31–44, 2025.

[13] V. A. Ferguson, S. Waldron, and D. J. Lim, "Market adjustments to import sanctions: Lessons from chinese restrictions on australian trade, 2020–21," *Review of International Political Economy*, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 1255–1281, 2023.

[14] S. Ahn and S. Steinbach, "The impact of COVID-19 trade measures on agricultural and food trade," *Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy*, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 911–927, 2023.

[15] M. Larch, J. Luckstead, and Y. V. Yotov, "Economic sanctions and agricultural trade," *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, vol. 106, no. 4, pp. 1477–1517, 2024.

[16] A. Grigoryan, "Russia, uae and china named top armenian export destinations," Armenpress Armenian News Agency, August 15 2025.

[17] A. Kochinyan and R. Ghevondyan, "Main dependencies of the republic of armenia on the russian federation: Threats and solutions," Research Center on Security Policy and Union of Informed Citizens, Tech. Rep., May 2025.

[18] European External Action Service, "European union and armenia adopt new strategic agenda to deepen partnership," Delegation of the European Union to Armenia, December 2 2025.

[19] Economic Development and Research Center, "Balance of payments and foreign trade: Armenia," n.d.