Volume 18 • Issue 2 • PP: 11–25 • 2026
Severity Scores, Listing Latency and Prioritization Efficiency: Evidence from the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog
Open Access & Copyright
© 2026 The Author(s). Published by ASPG. This article is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0).
Abstract
Vulnerability managers receive more CVE records each year than they can patch, and the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has become the most widely used public signal of which ones matter. We link the catalog as of 29 July 2026 to every National Vulnerability Database record published from January 2022 to June 2026 and ask which vulnerabilities are listed, how soon, and how well information available at disclosure ranks them. Fewer than one published CVE in two hundred reached the catalog. Listing was front-loaded: among CVEs listed within a year, 29% were listed on or before their publication day and 67% within 30 days. A Critical base score multiplied the listing hazard roughly tenfold, yet a CVSS ranking caught 39% of later listings at a workload of 8.6% of new CVEs; a logistic model adding weakness family and the issuing authority’s listing history caught 60% at that workload on a temporal hold-out. Scores supplied by numbering authorities ranked better than NVD’s own. Vendor concentration fell after 2023, ransomware labels mostly arrived long after listing, and remediation windows shortened to 14 and then 3 days in 2026.
Keywords
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